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Postface 
Suhail Malik and Tirdad Zolghadr 
 
Suhail Malik: What I find striking about both of the conferences 
organized in Arles—“The Human Snapshot” and “The Flood of 
Rights”—is that an object is being produced by the conferences 
themselves, in a somewhat tentative, fragile, perhaps 
inconsistent way, but produced nonetheless. 
The object we have been trying to establish—somewhat by 
trying to figure out what it might be—is composed of three sets 
of practices, each of which is undergoing its own set of 
transformations: contemporary art and its legacy; human rights, 
at its edges; and the digital revolution in media and journalism. 
We might have different determinations of what that object is. 
For me, "The Flood of Rights" conference gave shape and 
traction to this still-uncertain manifold object-under-invention: 
what was striking across the discussions was the centrality of 
the image as a primary vector for historical rights claims, 
political congregation, media organization and reorganization, 
psycho-noetic formation, and art. I was struck by how images—what 
they are as well as their place, time, and frame of reference—
were each time taken to be not only mutating in our time, but 
also mutating our time. The conference gave specificity to this 
broad and generalizing characterization of technical, historical, 
and pragmatic “mutation,” and the new conditions, practices, 
institutions, and ideas that are now emerging, as well as those 
that will be required in the future. 
As we saw and heard at the conference, these changes are 
not always comfortable or satisfactory. Quite the contrary. The 
question is whether the new configurations can be adequately 
thought out and understood, and what to do with that revised 
understanding. 
Assuming your minimal assent to these broad proposals, I 
wonder if we can be more exact as to what these new 
configurations might be and what they might mean. 
 
Tirdad Zolghadr: I’m eager to find traction using the image as 
primary vector, but I need help. Especially when it comes to “The 
Human Snapshot” conference in 2011—even though distance usually 
makes the reification process easier. Perhaps my memory of “The 
Human Snapshot” is murky because it lies in the shadow of a 
double reification already. There’s the book, which was praised 
as an incredibly handsome object, even before anyone had turned a 
single page. It’s something that holds its own ground; it is 
neither a full nor a faithful representation of the conference 
itself. The Jackson Pollock Bar performance at “The Flood of 
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Rights” conference equally serves as an imposing visual emblem 
for “The Human Snapshot” a posteriori.1  
Moreover, “The Human Snapshot” conference itself was 
subject to an entropy that allowed for so many beguiling subplots 
to emerge. Sandi Hilal’s discussion of the impossibility of 
visualizing a right of return was framed somewhat oddly by Eyal 
Weizman’s declaration of the end of testimony and a forensics of 
the future. This in turn resonated strangely with Ariella 
Azoulay’s radical methodological focus on context/reception. Some 
unintended dialogues were art-ontological in character, and 
others addressed the wonderful world of Thomas Hirschhorn.  
The 2013 conference comes closer to the object you refer 
to, even if some speakers addressed the image only with 
perfunctory interest. Some did venture a discussion that was 
blatantly ontological in its implications, even at very 
unexpected moments (Eric Kluitenberg on the exclusion of the 
nonhuman, Sohrab Mohebbi on how images have been used to wage war 
in Syria). Moreover, a number of speakers addressed a tacit, 
intrinsic promise of redemption in the image per se. Amanda 
Beech, David Levine, and Rony Brauman did so with measured 
skepticism, while others allowed for an emancipatory potential in 
and through a new visualization of cosmopolitanism (Rosalyn 
Deutsche) or in photojournalistic structures allowing for new 
forms of authorship (David Campbell). Still others saw redemption 
in overcoming the image (Hito Steyerl).  
But even in the above cases, I would speak less of a 
specificity, and more of a momentum, at best. A gravitational 
pull, a swerve, of the kind you can sense when you veer round a 
corner on a country road. Which I guess does point to the 
etymological meaning of trope. 
 
SM: Yes, what I'm trying to identify is something more like a 
momentum than something specific to any one speaker or a subset 
of them. My initial, softly placed question is whether this 
momentum is that of the discourse invented at these two 
conferences, or whether they reflect a gathering momentum in 
human rights practices themselves. The reflection we are 
undertaking presents a good occasion to draw out some overarching 
or general concerns that pervaded the papers and discussion, and 
warrants more explicit thematization. This might also allow some 
identification of what is specific to human-rights practices at 
this moment in time, as opposed to earlier moments in its 																																																								
1 The Jackson Pollock Bar is a Freiburg based art collective that produces reenactments of panels and 
lectures that are historically relevant to the institutional setting in question. For the Arles conference 2012, 
the collective reenacted the roundtable that marked the book launch of the Human Snapshot catalogue at 
MoMA NY. 	
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practical history.   
In particular, the shift that I think many of the 
presentations at “The Flood of Rights” pointed to is that images 
are now not just vectors or mediators for human-rights claims, 
but have themselves become rights-bearing objects (or maybe even 
subjects). As much as images continue to support or convey human-
rights claims and causes, is it also now the case—as I think 
almost all of the presentations at “The Flood of Rights” 
conference proposed more or less explicitly—that what is 
happening with and to images themselves is itself a matter of 
rights? Whether with respect to how images arrive, circulate, and 
have offscreen effects; or how image technologies change the very 
construction of information, journalism, and authorship; or the 
changing mobilization of images for or against statist coercion—
in each of these cases, images play a key role because of their 
content, which is well-established and expected, but also because 
of their media transmissibility and the need for them to compete 
for attention in “real time. 
The dimension of transmission now structures the politics 
of rights claims and, because of this mediatic-competitive 
pressure, becomes integral to that politics. Images are then not 
just representation of causes for human-rights appeals taking 
place before and outside of the image. They also have their own 
rights: the recording and transmitting of those causes and 
appeals is a general right that needs to be secured if specific 
rights claims are to gain attention and mobilize support. This 
mechanism, which was frequently mentioned at the conference, has 
been crucial in the dynamics of protest-through-social-media 
since 2011, both local to those protests and also with global 
extension.   
I'm not sure if this condition or demand is a reiteration 
of a now-standard liberal case for “freedom of expression” or the 
“free media.” It does not propose that the author or purveyor of 
the image has the right to show and transmit what they wish; 
rather, it suggests that if images do take a key role in human-
rights practices, and permit a very rapid “live” transmission 
from the specific and local cause of human rights to a global 
scale, then the human-rights regime must now incorporate images 
within itself as a priority. Human rights are to include—and are 
instantiated by—not just humans as their traditional rights-
bearers but also images themselves. Moreover, human rights 
incorporate and are instantiated by images themselves as part of 
the practical universality of that regime. Now intrinsic to the 
practical organization of human rights, images have rights of a 
kind. 
This is, of course, a highly speculative development, but 
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it conveys the two questions that the presentations at “The Flood 
of Rights” put forward for me: Are images now constitutive for 
human rights claims to have any traction? And is it then 
necessary to include image-making and transmission as an 
integral, rather than merely supporting, part of the human-rights 
regime? 
 
TZ: And the reason why the conjunction of images and rights is so 
intriguing is precisely because images can no longer do it for 
themselves. If an overall momentum is indeed reflected in and by 
the conference, it is one of, well, not scopophobia exactly, but 
of scopofatigue, or scoposkepticism. With the exception of one or 
two participants, the speakers posited their respective visual 
material in terms of its being overwhelmed by some context or 
other. Flooded, gutted, swamped. A flood of journalistic and 
theoretical discourse, a glut of psycho-behaviorist paradigms, a 
crushing digital turn that turns the image inside out and strips 
it of agency. (Much of which, come to think of it, may nicely tie 
the 2011 conference to the 2013 one.) Some spoke vividly of the 
need to overcome our hopes and expectations regarding the image 
tutti quanti, with Beech being the most radical in this respect.  
In light of “snapshots as human-rights bearers,” it is no 
longer about images as a menacing flood, but of images being at a 
disadvantage, as it were. A fundamentally embattled, defensive 
position. This is counterintuitive in the face of a flood-of-
images kind of zeitgeist like ours. In other words, if images 
were to become constitutive parts of the human-rights regime, and 
if our colleague Thomas Keenan were to open the Image Rights 
Project in a new office on the Bard College campus, images could 
be “constitutive” in the way human subjects are in terms of their 
needs and demands, but not in the proactive way that language, 
laws, courts of law, and universities might be.  
Beyond novelty, this emphasis is helpful in that it points 
beyond what you call the “standard liberal case for freedom of 
expression,” which does indeed need to be transcended. Now if the 
“flood of images and/as a flood of rights” can be something less 
threatening, less dramatic than what the typical, spontaneous 
take on that trope would suggest, then we’re onto something very 
peculiar. The conversation about the rights of an image becomes 
one that infringes on the, shall we say, inalienable dignity of 
the image in question. The right to a “realistic” epistemic 
framework, to an “adequate,” discursive overlay, to an 
“appropriate” ethos of copyright and copyleft, and so forth. 
 
SM: Scoposkepticism is a fine coining. It aptly captures the 
almost-required critical response to the prevalence of images in 
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constructing the public face of the human-rights regime. Olivia 
Custer makes the case that the tribulations of the human-rights 
images are in some ways due to such images: on the one hand, they 
bear the great weight of providing evidence, coupled (as though 
that wasn’t enough) with the moral certitude of their injunction. 
(In her phrasing: the required moral action “goes without saying” 
because we can see it all so clearly in the images.) On the other 
hand, it is for this very reason—and, in particular, after Colin 
Powell’s calamitous presentation of “evidence” of Iraq's WMDs at 
the UN in 2003—that images must now be treated with caution at 
best, if not outright wariness and downright suspicion. In other 
words, now that images are predominant power vectors in the human 
rights regime and therefore agents of hegemonic force, instances 
of spectacularization, we ought to be wary of them. Wary is 
homophonic with weary, and that is also right if it's accepted, 
as you say, that we are overwhelmed by images demanding our 
urgent attention and care. Scopofatigue, indeed. 
But then, if I understand you correctly, and to again use 
a core distinction in Custer’s argument in a slightly different 
way, we are in a condition in which an increasing quantitative 
pressure of images—each one trying to convince us that action is 
needed, placing urgent demands on us, calling for rights to be 
respected—is met with a qualitative distinction between that 
systemic proliferation and the implored-to subject in the 
adequacy of her or his attention, motivations, and 
responsibilities. Such a recoil allows the subject of these 
claims to act on the basis of a common—if not universal—morality, 
to come up for air from this flood of images. Campbell described 
the changing conditions in constructing the imperative borne by 
the image well, and Brauman, Levine, Steyerl, and Stiegler, each 
in their own way, also spoke about how that quantitative-systemic 
image proliferation properly requires their gasping addressee to 
be on the defensive if they/we are to catch their/our breath. (I 
take Beech to be arguing that we ought to give up such a critical 
stance toward images, as though we could in any case escape their 
force, accepting instead that the politics of images is 
occasioned only within and through their rhetorical power and, to 
extend her argument, perhaps even their wild quantitative 
overload). 
Yet, as each of these speakers remarked, it's also the 
case that we cannot do without the image in making public claims 
in the human-rights regime, partly as one form of testimony, 
among others, and also—despite all the built-in tampering 
Photoshop permits—for the objectivity of that evidence; and no 
less because the well-shot image captures public interest in the 
competition of daily attention, or, as for Deutsche on Krzysztof 
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Wodiczko, as a respite from the perpetual image-based war. It’s 
in this latter sense of images’ current necessity to the human-
rights regime (taking Kluitenberg’s lead) that I was trying to 
make a case for them as rights-bearers in and of themselves, and 
not just as conveyers of rights claims happening elsewhere. If I 
understand your final sentences correctly, then yes: The question 
is what do those rights amount to? What vexations and struggles 
would fill the syllabus at the newly established Image Rights 
Project on the picturesque banks of Annandale-on-Hudson? Because, 
as you remark, and as Levine dramatized at the conference and in 
this book, it's never just the image on its own or in relation to 
the ethical place of the photographer that determines the rights-
bearing work of the image. Rather, it is the image, always 
together with the infrastructure that guarantees its realism; the 
image with the discourses by which it gains traction (or doesn’t, 
or, as Brauman demonstrates, gains the wrong traction; or does 
then doesn’t, as in Powell’s UN display). Not to mention the 
struggles over ownership, publication, and accrued profits, 
thanks to how and where the image appears: that is, to appreciate 
images as wealth generators as intrinsic to the construction and 
prosecution of rights claims. For sure, it’s this complex, 
historical, and highly institutionalized articulation and 
condition that could constitute an image-rights regime whereby 
the image would itself be a rights-bearer rather than only by 
virtue of its content. 
For this very reason, and to disagree with your 
provocation, it seems to me that this does not really amount to 
or require the “dignity” of images. It’s rather a systemic, 
infrastructural, and institutional feature of how rights claims 
are made manifest today, especially since digitization has made 
image-capture and distribution devices much more ubiquitous. To 
use a word that deconstruction has banished from having any 
affirmative sense, it’s an issue of image propriety rather than 
dignity. If propriety and dignity are often directly identified 
with one another in the humanist tradition (culminating with 
something like Kantian morality), the rights-bearing image regime 
proposes a fracture between them. Dignity cannot be the condition 
for this expanded regime because the images themselves (rather 
than what they show or demonstrate) are eminently disposable, 
either literally thrown away or swept aside with a swipe on the 
iPad, or stored in a bunch of cardboard boxes in sterile 
environments. Without restoring some auratic condition for these 
images, which would countermand the very quantitative expansion 
that is proposed as the condition for the problem we are seeking 
to articulate, it seems to me that we cannot call on dignity as a 
premise for this image-rights regime. 
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What the image-rights regime asks is then whether we can 
really extend the rights regime on the basis of upholding 
“dignity,” as is the case with animals, life in general, 
environments (for example, the Amazon as an “actant” in 
litigation), and even machines (with the encroaching reality of 
Artificial General Intelligence). The built-in disposability of 
the rights-bearing image suggests not. Or, rather, either one 
gives up the notion of an image-rights regime in order to 
preserve dignity as the virtuous condition of rights, limited 
then to the indispensable bearer (which is to say, extended to 
any bearer of dignity, who is then given a worth, the status of a 
subject); or one gives up dignity as what rights recognize and 
legitimize beyond legal and historical circumstance, because that 
is too restricted a determination of what the image-rights regime 
inaugurates and how it works. The hypothesis here—which is 
admittedly highly tenuous—favors the latter. 
Generalizing this tentative claim further, in the image-
rights regime quantity overcomes quality and the rights-bearer is 
disposable. Dignity returns, thanks only to the recoil from the 
insistent overdemand of the image flux as we now have it. 
However, to go against your plea for a “less threatening” and 
“less dramatic” determination of the flood of rights/images, such 
a recoil from quantitative determination in any case has to 
contend with the impending problem of how to conceive rights 
extending to a world that, by common estimate, will have eleven 
billion people in it by 2100, throwing the planet into a wholly 
new geopolitical configuration (coupled with the transformation 
of habitation and food supply wrought by climate change). How 
will human-rights principles be organized without reference to 
quantity in that future? Without, that is, an emphatic insistence 
on the economic determinants of human and other rights? Posing 
that question is not at all to dispense with dignity as a 
requirement for human and other sapient life or sentience (the 
danger of such a dispensing, practically realized, is of course 
at the base of the modern institutionalization of the human-
rights regime); nor is it to propose that the increased numbers 
of people on the planet are disposable. Very much to the 
contrary: the question is how to constitute and organize rights 
better for all people and others, up to and including their 
collective and individual dignity (at whatever scale), when both 
the extension of what a rights-bearer might be and also the sheer 
number of who traditional rights-bearers are require together a 
practical and therefore theoretical redetermination of rights in 
terms other than those provided by qualitative claims of dignity, 
contrasted to disposability as its negative quantitative 
counterpart. 
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 So, to pile one hypothesis on top of another, if the 
assumption of dignity is a residue of a theological-to-humanist 
residue of the natural rights tradition, or of rights as based on 
an exorbitance of justice to legal or operational propriety or 
disposition, then an image-rights regime would be the index of a 
nonanthropological, nontheological determination of rights per 
se—a determination of rights that is not ethical but political, 
economic, and mediatic; occasioned, that is, via systemic 
propriety and economy rather than distinct to them. Its demand 
would reverse the determination of rights against its now 
standard assumptions; rights would have to be constituted and 
organized in terms of quantity/number/extension rather than by 
seeking solace in quality/idea/singularity. The image-rights 
regime shows a way to comprehend the construction of a rights 
regime that observes quantitative universality, maxing out on the 
numbers rather than stipulating the even more exhausting 
principles of an each-time unique appeal. It proposes that human 
rights and their derivatives are included but are not the 
necessary reference of rights, even in their construction. 
Distinct to a qualitative notion of universalism with its 
correlative determination of the disposable as “whatever,” the 
quantitative universalism of the image-rights regime apprehends 
the disposed-of to be generic—one rights claim among others in a 
political-mediatic economy of rights—but also infeasible as a 
“whatever” that could be cast aside in favor of a yet-more-
singular claim.  
 
TZ: Scopofatigue; both wary and weary. Judging by the efficacy of 
your puns, I think you’re more of a deconstructivist than you’d 
care to admit. (Forgive me for pointing out that propriety, 
property, and the proper is another deconstruction classic.) For 
all the object-oriented thinking that is unmistakably bleeding 
into this conversation, it seems that good old post-structuralism 
continues to haunt us here. This can only be a good thing, as 
long as the conversation doesn’t become a pedantic 
Generationskonflikt such as the one unilaterally waged by Hal 
Foster against Azoulay and Keenan’s trahison des clercs, their 
ostensible “universalism,” at the launch of The Human Snapshot 
book in New York in April 2013.2 
It’s a little tragic that Foster was snarky over homonyms 
that day. The reinvention of the term universalism within the 
latter-day field of human rights has moved far beyond the bad 
object of a half century ago. And since I have no intention of 
snarking around for no reason, I’m wary (not weary) of testing my 																																																								
2 The presentations and discussion can be viewed at: http://www.moma.org/visit/calendar/events/17885.	
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own interdisciplinary limits here. I’ve tried, as far as a 
contemporary-art curator realistically can, to take 
interdisciplinary cajoling with human rights very seriously. More 
seriously than the way it’s usually deployed in contemporary art. 
(Forensics!) Working with and through human rights in Arles, New 
York, and Al-Quds Bard College, Abu Dis, has been nothing less 
than Copernican in its impact on my curatorial practice. But for 
every moment of cross-pollination, there must have been ten blunt 
reminders of the stark differences that divide the fields. The 
homonyms at play are faux amis—they represent deeply different 
wagers. (This is not good or bad, it just is.) 
When you say that dignity cannot be the condition for this 
expanded regime, I duly pump my fist in the air, but am not 
entirely sure how dignity plays into this within the context of 
recent human-rights debates. My above-introduction of the term, I 
confess, was prompted by personal experience. Most of my high 
school education was in German, where the term for dignity is 
Würde. I can actually remember the classroom discussion that was 
my introduction to the human-rights conundrum at large. It was 
about the first sentence of the German constitution, Die Würde 
eines Menschen ist unantastbar (“The dignity of a human being is 
untouchable”). Why, we were asked, isn’t it the human who is 
untouchable but the dignity thereof? Aside from Kant quotations 
on the blackboard, I cannot remember the pedagogical upshot here, 
but I do know Würde is an etymological cousin of “worth.” A trait 
that can and usually will differ—quantitatively—as untouchable as 
that worth may ultimately be. Dignity, by contrast, harks back to 
the Proto-Indo-European verb dek: “to be suitable,” which is 
related to “decent.” I suppose Würde does come closer to your 
argument. Less of a theologico-moral and more of an economico-
quantitative affair.  
And when it comes to maxing out on the numbers, you’re 
taking my own feeble suggestion to its own logical—and daunting—
conclusion. And yet, since I have only just rediscovered quality 
as a category within contemporary art, thanks to the likes of 
Claire Bishop, Maria Lind, and others, your proposal catches me 
off-balance. The issue of quality dovetails with that of 
universalism in curating, in that both of these categories are 
revealed to having been operative all along. So it is not so much 
that they have been reintroduced as that they are being 
reemphasized. 
Perhaps quantity operating along the above lines within the 
arts would constitute a way out of some persistent dilemmas. For 
example, the problem of a renewed valorization of quality also 
dovetails with the problem of universalism in that, well, just 
imagine the Euro-American critic unleashed. Spewing unchecked 
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aesthetic judgment across the world. Post-structuralism may have 
been a foil—one that, in the worst case, would conveniently hide 
ongoing aesthetic judgments from view, leaving them all the more 
unchecked—but at the very least, it did control the damage. At 
least the heaving Euro-Americans had to choose their words 
carefully.  
I am, to say the least, eager to learn how well the 
aforementioned economic determinants would potentially work as 
foil or damage control, or as a new paradigm entirely. I will 
admit that they already do hint, for all their intimidations, at 
exit routes that seem refreshing. Today, images are often 
mobilized because they substitute and sublimate the need for 
tougher demands, for human rights discussions and financial 
market discussions, and so on. Whether the issue is “Latin 
American art” or “the Palestinian plight,” images are known to 
run the risk of being stopgap panaceas that can supplant the 
issues rather than render them more transparent. And anchoring an 
image firmly within, as you yourself put it, a “determination of 
rights actually occasioned via systemic propriety rather than 
distinct to them,” may well be a way forward here. Perhaps an 
artist can help with that. Or an investment banker. 
 
 
